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I.

INTRODUCTION

This case arises from an order entered by Administrative District Judge Melissa Moody
of the Fourth Judicial District on November 6, 2017 finding Mark Colafranceschi to be a
vexatious litigant under Idaho Court Administrative Rule 59. (R. at 451-460.) Mr. Colafranceschi
now appeals that order.
Mr. Colafranceschi’s central allegation is that Judge Moody’s order is unfair because other
people who have been declared vexatious litigants have engaged in more egregious behavior than
his; her determination that he is a vexatious litigant focused on conduct in one case as opposed to
multiple; and Judge Moody purportedly either disregarded or improperly weighed evidence in
reaching her decision.
None of these arguments establish that Judge Moody abused her discretion. Idaho Court
Administrative Rule 59(d) allows an administrative judge to declare a person to be a vexatious
litigant if they find that person has engaged in any one of four categories of conduct. The category
applied by Judge Moody in this case is subsection (3), which prohibits three types of conduct: (1)
repeatedly filing unmeritorious motions, pleadings, or other papers; (2) conducting unnecessary
discovery; and (3) engaging in other tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause delay.
Idaho Ct. Admin. R. 59(d)(3). Engaging in this conduct “[i]n any litigation” is sufficient to
support a vexatious litigant determination. Id. In his divorce proceeding, Mr. Colafranceschi
propounded 380 discovery requests, which included requests for information related to his exwife’s sexual history and whether she had been raped by her ex-husband. (See R. at 456 (citing
Aff. of Scott Ludwig Ex 8, at 3, 6, Neustadt v. Colafranceschi, No. CV 2016-125-C (Valley Cty.).)
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When she declined to respond, Mr. Colafranceschi filed several motions to compel. (Id.)
Judge Moody found the discovery requests unnecessary and frivolous, and the subsequent
motions to compel answers likewise unmeritorious. (Id.) She properly applied the plain language
of Rule 59 to Mr. Colafranceschi’s conduct in reaching her determination.

(Id.)

Mr.

Colafranceschi’s belief that he did not behave badly enough to justify the entry of a prefiling order
does not mean that Judge Moody acted outside the boundaries of her discretion in doing so. In
her order, Judge Moody expressly acknowledged the gravity of a vexatious litigant finding, but
determined Mr. Colafranceschi’s behavior was sufficient to warrant the entry of a prefiling order
nonetheless. (Id. at 455-57.)
For the foregoing reasons set forth in greater detail below, this Court should affirm Judge
Moody’s vexatious litigant determination and uphold the prefiling order.
II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Mr. Colafranceschi has been involved in a divorce proceeding with his former spouse,
Julie Neustadt, since a petition for divorce was filed on May 6, 2016. (R. at 66 (citing Petition
for Divorce, Neustadt v. Colafranceschi, No. CV 2016-125-C (Valley Cty. May 6, 2016)).
On March 16, 2017, counsel for Ms. Neustadt filed a motion requesting a referral to the
presiding Administrative District Judge for a determination as to whether Mr. Colafranceschi
should be declared a vexatious litigant. (R. at 61.) Mr. Colafranceschi filed two objections to
that motion; one on March 20, 2017, and another on March 29, 2017. (Id.) He also filed a
response on April 12, 2017. (Id.)
Judge Moody entered her “Proposed Findings and Notice of Intent to Issue a Prefiling
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Order” on April 19, 2017. (R. at 61-69.) Her proposed findings state that Mr. Colafranceschi’s
conduct satisfied three of the four bases upon which a person might be declared a vexatious
litigant under Rule 59(d). (R. at 62-63 ¶¶ A, B, C making findings under 59(d)(1), (2) and (3),
respectively).
His conduct satisfied 59(d)(1) because he had commenced, prosecuted or maintained three
litigations in the past seven years pro se that had been decided against him. (R. at 62 (citing
Colafranceschi v. Schoonover, Valley County case no. CV 2010-312-C; Colafranceschi v.
Boomer, Valley County Case No. CV 2012-375-C; and citing Colafranceschi v. Briley, Valley
County Case No. CV 2012-376-C)).
His conduct satisfied 59(d)(2) because he had made meritless attempts to re-litigate
adverse outcomes in two cases. (R. at 63 (citing Colafranceschi v. Schoonover, Valley County
Case No. CV 2010-312-C (finding that Mr. Colafranceschi’s second motion to set aside a final
judgment and his subsequent appeal was frivolous); citing Neustadt v. Colafranceschi, Valley
County Case No. CV 2016-125-C (finding that motion to reconsider divorce decree was an
attempt to reargue issues previously decided, and that motion to set aside judgment was
frivolous)).
His conduct satisfied 59(d)(3) because he had submitted needlessly burdensome discovery
requests for information that were both irrelevant and deliberately targeted an extremely personal
and delicate subject matter, and then filed motions to compel responses to those requests. (R. at
63 (citing Neustadt v. Colafranceschi, Valley County Case No. CV 2016-125-C in which Mr.
Colafranceschi propounded 380 discovery requests, some of which sought information related to
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his ex-wife’s sexual history and whether she had been raped, and filed several motions to compel
at least one of which was denied in its entirety)).
Mr. Colafranceschi filed a written objection to Judge Moody’s proposed findings on May
1, 2017 in a document entitled “Administrative Court: Response and Affidavit to Proposed
Findings and Notice of Intent to Issue a Prefiling Order.” (R. at 253-72.) In that written objection,
Mr. Colafranceschi requested that the proposed prefiling order be dismissed, or in the alternative
that he be permitted to present evidence to counter the proposed findings. (R. at 271.)
Judge Moody entered an order on June 12, 2017, granting Mr. Colafranceschi’s request to
present evidence in support of his objections to her findings. (R. at 308.) She set a hearing
pursuant to Rule 59(e), and Mr. Colafranceschi submitted exhibits (see R. at 311 (“Administrative
Court: Notice of Exhibits”)) and subpoenaed witnesses in advance of hearing (R. at 359-60
(“Subpoena for Hearing”)).
The hearing was held on August 7, 2017. (R. at 380.) At the hearing, Mr. Colafranceschi
claimed for the first time that he had contacted attorneys prior to filing lawsuits identified by
Judge Moody in her proposed findings, and that he had been told by those attorneys that the
lawsuits had merit. (Id.) Given these claims, Judge Moody gave Mr. Colafranceschi until
September 7, 2017 to submit written evidence substantiating these claims, at which point she
would take the matter under advisement before entering a decision. (R. at 381.) On September
12, 2017, Judge Moody extended that deadline to October 15, 2017. (R. at 434.)
Mr. Colafranceschi submitted affidavits from Curt McKenzie, Carol Griffith, Sam
Johnson, Nate Peterson, Terri Melcher, and two from himself. (R. at 452.) After considering
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these materials, on November 6, 2017, Judge Moody entered an order declaring Mr.
Colafranceschi to be a vexatious litigant (R. at 451-57) and a prefiling order prohibiting Mr.
Colafranceschi from filing any new civil actions in Idaho courts pro se without first obtaining
leave of court where the litigation is proposed to be filed (R. at 459).
Citing the affidavits submitted by Mr. Colafranceschi after the August 7th hearing, Judge
Moody’s order dismissed the findings in her proposed prefiling order under Rule 59(d)(1) and
(2). (R. at 451-56.) She dismissed her findings under 59(d)(1) because the affidavit of Terri
Melcher suggested Mr. Colafranceschi had been told by an attorney prior to filing one of the three
cases cited that it had merit. (R. at 454.) She dismissed her findings under 59(d)(2) because in
one of the two cases cited Justice Schroeder wrote that it was not unreasonable for Mr.
Colafranceschi to retry issues related to the custody determination. (R. at 456.) However, “no
evidence or argument” altered her conclusion with respect to her proposed finding under 59(d)(3).
(R. at 456-57.) Therefore, she adopted that proposed finding and declared Mr. Colafranceschi to
be a vexatious litigant. (Id. at 457.)
III.

ISSUE ON APPEAL

Did Judge Moody abuse her discretion when she found Mr. Colafranceschi to be a
vexatious litigant and entered an order requiring him to comply with pre-filing conditions before
commencing future litigation in Idaho courts pro se?
IV.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Proceedings governing vexatious litigants must comply with Idaho Court Administrative
Rule 59. See Idaho Ct. Admin. R. 59. A person found to be a vexatious litigant by an
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administrative district judge may appeal the order to the Idaho Supreme Court as a matter of right.
Idaho Ct. Admin. R. 59(f). Findings of fact will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Idaho
R. Civ. P. 52(a). An administrative judge’s vexatious litigant determination is a matter within
that judge’s discretion and is, therefore, reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Telford
v. Nye, 154 Idaho 606, 610, 301 P.3d 264, 268 (2013) (holding “Rule 59 uses discretionary
language: ‘An administrative judge may find a person to be a vexatious litigant . . . .’ Therefore,
we hold that an abuse of discretion standard applies on review.” (Citation omitted.)). The test for
determining whether Judge Moody abused her discretion is (1) whether she rightly perceived the
issue as one of discretion; (2) whether she acted within the boundaries of such discretion and
consistently with applicable legal standards; and (3) whether she reached her decision through an
exercise of reason. Id. (citing Schmechel v. Dille, 148 Idaho 176, 179, 219 P.3d 1192, 1195
(2009)).
V.
1.

ARGUMENT

Judge Moody correctly perceived the issue of whether to declare Mr. Colafranceschi
to be a vexatious litigant as one of discretion.
A successful challenge of a lower court ruling on the grounds that the judge did not

recognize the issue as one of discretion typically requires a showing that the court mistakenly
believed it was constrained in a way that caused it to enter the particular decision in question. For
example, in 917 Lusk, LLC v. City of Boise, the appellant successfully challenged a decision by
the City of Boise affirming a grant of a conditional use permit issued by the local Planning and
Zoning Commission that did not impose parking requirements as a condition of approval beyond
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those established by the local Parking Chapter. 158 Idaho 12, 15, 343 P.3d 41, 44 (2015). The
City’s decision as well as the subsequent district court decision upholding it were reversed. Id.,
158 Idaho at 20, 343 P.3d at 49. The record indicated the City and the district court failed to
recognize that statute authorized the commission to impose parking requirements beyond the
minimum amount established by the local Parking Chapter. Id., 158 Idaho at 17-18, 343 P.3d at
46-47. The City incorrectly believed it was constrained in a way that it was not and therefore
failed to recognize the issue to be decided as one of discretion. Id.
Here, there is no evidence that Judge Moody believed her hand was forced or that a
vexatious litigant determination was mandatory. In fact, the record strongly indicates Judge
Moody would not have made the vexatious litigant determination if she had reason to believe the
evidence did not support it. Judge Moody initially found Mr. Colafranceschi had engaged in
conduct that satisfied three of the four categories under Rule 59(d), and then vacated two of three
findings after weighing evidence presented at hearing and “construing every possible inference
in favor of Mr. Colafranceschi’s position.” (R. at 455.) She also made clear that she recognized
“it is a serious matter to be declared a vexatious litigant” and for that reason she was giving “Mr.
Colafranceschi every benefit of the doubt.” (R. at 454-55.) If she had believed the circumstances
did not warrant a finding under 59(d)(3), she would have dismissed that proposed finding just as
she did with her findings under 59(d)(1) and (2).
There is nothing in the record that indicates Judge Moody made her determination because
she believed she was constrained in some way, or because she misinterpreted the legal standard
to be applied. Her analysis indicates she recognized that a vexatious litigant determination is
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discretionary and that she properly exercised discretion when making her determination.
2.

Judge Moody acted within the outer boundaries of her discretion and consistent with
applicable legal standards.
Reversal of a lower court decision based on this prong of the abuse of discretion analysis

is typically based on a finding that the judge either failed to apply or incorrectly applied an
essential component of the applicable legal test. See 917 Lusk, LLC, 158 Idaho at 17-18, 343 P.3d
at 46-47; see also State v. Thompson, 132 Idaho 628, 635, 977 P.2d 890, 897 (1999). The
boundaries of an administrative judge’s discretion and the legal standards applicable to a
vexatious litigant determination are set forth in Rule 59. Subsection (d) permits the entry of a
prefiling order if the judge makes a finding that the person subject to the order has engaged in any
one of four types of conduct. Idaho Ct. Admin. R. 59(d). Judge Moody determined Mr.
Colafranceschi to be a vexatious litigant based on her finding that his conduct satisfied section
59(d)(3). (R. 456-57.) Under 59(d)(3):
(d) An administrative judge may find a person to be a vexatious litigant based on a
finding that a person has done any of the following:
(3) In any litigation while acting pro se, repeatedly files unmeritorious
motions, pleadings, or other papers, conducts unnecessary discovery, or
engages in other tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause delay.
Idaho Ct. Admin. R. 59(d)(3).
Judge Moody’s finding was as follows:
Mr. Colafranceschi has engaged in a pattern of conducting frivolous discovery, or
discovery solely intended to cause unnecessary delay, in the following cases[:]
1.

Neustadt v. Colafranceschi, Valley County case no. CV 2016-125-C. In a
divorce case, Mr. Colafranceschi propounded over 380 discovery requests,
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including 337 requests for admission. These requests included asking
Petitioner to describe the nature and duration of her affairs with other
married men in the last ten years and to admit that another man had raped
her. Aff. of Scot Ludwig Ex. 8, at 3, 6. The court concluded that many of
these requests were irrelevant. Mr. Colafranceschi filed several motions to
compel responses to his discovery requests, at least one of which was denied
in its entirety. Order Den. Mot. to Compel, Oct. 6, 2016.
(R. at 456.)
This conduct falls squarely within Rule 59(d)(3). Mr. Colafranceschi “conduct[ed]
unnecessary discovery” by submitting a needlessly burdensome volume of requests for
information that was both irrelevant and deliberately targeted an extremely personal and delicate
subject matter. The nature and volume of the requests suggest they were submitted for the purpose
of harassment and employed as a “tactic” that was “frivolous” or otherwise “solely intended to
cause unnecessary delay.” The filing of multiple motions to compel, at least one of which was
found to be entirely frivolous, to recover information in response to irrelevant, needlessly
burdensome discovery requests about a person’s sexual history or past history of sexual abuse,
supports a finding that Mr. Colafranceschi also “repeatedly fil[ed] unmeritorious motions.” The
plain language of Rule 59(d)(3) permits a vexatious litigant determination based on a finding that
a litigant has engaged in this type of conduct.
Mr. Colafranceschi argues Judge Moody violated applicable legal principles when she
made this finding because the Valley County case cited had not been finally determined when
Judge Moody made her vexatious litigant determination. (Appellants’ Br. at 14-15.) Rule
59(d)(3) requires only that the litigant engage in certain proscribed behavior “[i]n any litigation
while acting pro se. . . .” It does not require the litigation to be finally determined in order for the
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litigant’s conduct to be considered. Mr. Colafranceschi appears to be conflating section (d)(3)
with section (d)(2), which relates to attempts to re-litigate cases that have been “finally
determined.” Idaho Ct. Admin. R. 59(d)(2)(A) & (B). However, section (d) permits a vexatious
litigant determination based on a finding of “any” of the categories of conduct. Judge Moody
was not required to make an additional finding under 59(d)(2).
Mr. Colafranceschi claims Judge Moody violated applicable legal principles because her
finding was based on conduct in one case rather than multiple. (Appellant’s Br. at 20.) Again,
the plain language of 59(d)(3) permits a vexatious litigant determination based on a finding that
a litigant has engaged in certain conduct “[i]n any litigation while acting pro se”; it does not
require a finding based on conduct in multiple cases. Idaho Ct. Admin. R. 59(d)(3). Engaging in
conduct proscribed by the Rule in multiple cases may bolster support for an administrative judge’s
determination, but its absence does not bar a vexatious litigant determination under Rule 59.
Mr. Colafranceschi claims Judge Moody violated applicable legal principles because her
finding was based on one set of discovery. (Appellant’s Br. at 15.) The number of sets of requests
a litigant submits is arbitrary and inapposite. Mr. Colafranceschi’s “set” of requests included 380
requests. More to the point, the language of 59(d)(3) does not require abuse of the discovery
process through the use of multiple sets of discovery. It requires a litigant to either (1) conduct
“unnecessary discovery,” (2) to “repeatedly file[] unmeritorious motions,” or (3) to “engage in
other tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause delay.” Idaho Ct. Admin. R. 59(d)(3).
Judge Moody found that Mr. Colafranceschi had conducted unnecessary discovery, much of
which was frivolous, and that he had filed “several” motions to compel answers to that discovery,
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“at least one of which was denied in its entirety.” (R. at 456.) The Rule requires nothing more.
Mr. Colafranceschi argues Judge Moody failed to comply with applicable legal standards
because her order does not apply two of the four factors set forth by the Ninth Circuit in its review
of a vexatious litigant order in the case of De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1990).
(Appellant’s Br. at 25-26 (citing De Long, 912 F.2d at 1147-48).) De Long is a federal circuit
court case that does not analyze Idaho’s vexatious litigant rule and is therefore inapplicable. It is
also readily distinguishable.


In De Long, the litigant received no opportunity to oppose the vexatious litigant order
before it was entered. 912 F.2d at 1147.
o It is undisputed that Mr. Colafranceschi presented evidence and argument
challenging the prefiling order before it was filed. (See R. at 311, 380-81, 434,
452.)



In De Long, the district court failed to identify which filings of cases or motions supported
its determination. 912 F.2d at 1148.
o Judge Moody identified the case in which the unnecessary discovery and
associated motions to compel were filed. (R. at 456.)



In De Long, the district court made “no finding that De Long’s claims were frivolous.”
912 F.2d at 1148.
o Here, Judge Moody found that the discovery and subsequent motions to compel
filed by Mr. Colafranceschi in Valley County Case No. CV-2016-125-C were
frivolous. (R. at 456.)
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Finally, in De Long Court determined the vexatious litigant order was not properly
tailored. 912 F.2d at 1148. Rule 59 contains no tailoring requirement.
o The prohibitions that may be contained in a prefiling order are specific. Permitted
restrictions include “enter[ing] a prefiling order prohibiting a vexatious litigant
from filing any new litigation in the courts of this state pro se without first
obtaining leave of a judge of the court where the litigation is proposed to be filed”
and penalizing “[d]isobedience of a prefiling order entered” with contempt of court
or dismissal. Idaho Ct. Admin. R. 59(g), (h), (j). In light of the specific language
of the Rule 59, the tailoring of restrictions Mr. Colafranceschi calls for could be
construed as an impermissible application of legal principles and an abuse of
discretion.

3.

Judge Moody determined Mr. Colafranceschi to be a vexatious litigant through an
exercise of reason.
“The role of this Court, in determining if the district court reached its decision by

an exercise of reason, is to review the process the district court engaged in to make its decision.”
Palmer v. Spain, 138 Idaho 798, 801-02, 69 P.3d 1059, 1062-63 (2003) (citing Sheridan v. St.
Lukes Reg'l Med. Ctr., 135 Idaho 775, 781, 25 P.3d 88, 94 (2001)). The district court must
“disclose its reasoning” unless its reasoning is obvious from the record. Id., 138 Idaho at 802, 69
P.3d at 1063 (citation omitted).
Judge Moody demonstrated in her order declaring Mr. Colafranceschi to be a vexatious
litigant that her determination was based on a careful consideration of the relevant factual
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circumstances and legal principles. On the issue of whether Mr. Colafranceschi satisfied one of
the four types of conduct prohibited by section (d), Judge Moody specifically recounted reasons
why evidence presented at hearing cast the findings in the proposed prefiling order related to
59(d)(1) and (2) “in a different light.” (R. at 452-56.) She considered evidence presented by Mr.
Colafranceschi in response to the findings in the proposed prefiling order and dismissed the
findings in her proposed prefiling order under Rule 59(d)(1) and (2) after considering the evidence
presented. (R. at 451-56.) She dismissed her findings under 59(d)(1) because the affidavit of
Terri Melcher suggested Mr. Colafranceschi had been told by an attorney prior to filing one of
the three cases cited that it had merit. (R. at 454.) She dismissed her findings under 59(d)(2)
because in one of the two cases cited Justice Schroeder wrote that it was not unreasonable for Mr.
Colafranceschi to retry issues related to the custody determination. (R. at 456.)
As a result, Judge Moody clarified that she did not rely on those findings in making her
final determination. (Id.) She then differentiated subsection (3) and made clear that unlike
subsections (1) and (2), there was no evidence or argument presented at hearing that “alters the
Court’s conclusion” with respect to her finding that Mr. Colafranceschi had engaged in conduct
proscribed by that section of 59(d). (R. 456-57.) The change in findings from the proposed
prefiling order to the one ultimately entered shows that Judge Moody carefully considered the
evidence presented and reached her conclusion through the exercise of reason.
Mr. Colafranceschi argues that Judge Moody failed to reach her decision through an
exercise of reason because pro se litigants labeled vexatious in other states have engaged in more
egregious conduct. (See Appellant’s Br. 20-21.) He compares this case to cases in other states in
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which “litigants have filed dozens of motions either during the pendency of an action or relating
to the same judgment.” (Id. (citing Bravo v. Ismaj, 99 Cal. App. 4th 211, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 879
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)). Identifying dozens of frivolous motions is not required by Rule 59.
Mr. Colafranceschi fails to explain how more egregious behavior by litigants in other states shows
that Judge Moody abused her discretion when she made her vexatious litigant determination in
this case. Judge Moody applied the relevant Rule as written and Mr. Colafranceschi’s conduct
satisfies the Rule’s plain language.
Throughout his briefing, Mr. Colafranceschi tries to establish that Judge Moody failed to
reach her decision through an exercise of reason by re-litigating various facts or arguing that
Judge Moody weighed evidence incorrectly or purportedly did not consider certain evidence. He
argues Judge Moody abused her discretion because she purportedly failed to consider statements
by Ms. Neustadt about the amount of money Ms. Neustadt is willing to spend on legal
representation in litigation with Mr. Colafranceschi. (Appellant’s Br. at 21.) He argues that
questions in discovery asking Ms. Neustadt to describe the nature and duration of purported
affairs with other married men in the preceding ten years and to admit that another man had raped
her were “reasonable and necessary based upon [Ms. Neustadt’s] own claim that she would harm
[Mr. Colafranceschi] by making [a] false allegation of PTSD.” (Id. at 17.) He lists 27 “false
allegations and bad acts” allegedly committed by Ms. Neustadt that Judge Moody purportedly
failed to consider. (Id. at 11-12.) He claims Judge Moody inappropriately gave weight to the
contents of a written statement by Carl Miller related to his use of the judicial process to harass
witnesses. (Id. at 6-7.) He claims Judge Moody incorrectly perceived Ms. Neustadt’s distress
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based on her courtroom demeanor. (Id. at 8.) He argues Judge Moody’s determination should be
reversed in light of the contents of a list of documents that have been created since the prefiling
order was entered. (Id. at 13-14.)
This type of challenge to Judge Moody’s factual findings does not establish an abuse of
discretion. On appeal, the Court “will not substitute [its] view of the facts for the view of the
district court.” Mortensen v. Berian, 163 Idaho 47, 408 P.3d 45, 48 (2017) (quoting Marshall v.
Blair, 130 Idaho 675, 679, 946 P.2d 975, 979 (1997)). “In view of this role, the trial court’s
findings of fact will be liberally construed in favor of the judgment entered.” Id. (quoting Sun
Valley Shamrock Res., Inc. v. Travelers Leasing Corp., 118 Idaho 116, 118-119, 794 P.2d 1389,
1391-92 (1990)). Rule 59 lays out the standard to be applied when making a vexatious litigant
determination and the Rule contains no mention of some type of mandatory weighing or balancing
the administrative judge must conduct. Judge Moody found that Mr. Colafranceschi engaged in
conduct prohibited by Rule 59. How she weighed the evidence before her in reaching that
determination is not a basis to overturn it.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The thrust of this appeal appears to be Mr. Colafranceschi’s belief that the entry of a
prefiling order is too serious a consequence for his behavior. While Mr. Colafranceschi might
consider the outcome unfair, Judge Moody did not abuse her discretion is reaching it. Mr.
Colafranceschi’s issue is not actually with how Judge Moody applied Rule 59, but with the
language of Rule 59 itself. His appeal to this Court boils down to one question: How can there
be a Rule that allows the entry of a prefiling order in a case such as this? But that is not the

15

question to be decided in this appeal. The question to be decided is whether Judge Moody abused
her discretion when she applied the Rule as written to Mr. Colafranceschi’s conduct. Based on
the foregoing, the answer is clearly “No.” For these reasons, the State requests that the Court
affirm the Prefiling Order entered by Judge Moody in this case.
DATED July 9, 2018.
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